EXAMS 2026

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“A power-sharing Executive Committee simply has not worked in Northern Ireland.” Assess this view.

The view that the power-sharing Executive Committee in Northern Ireland “simply has not worked” is a commonly held view. Radio phone ins and press reports are filled with disgruntled constituents and exasperated politicians complaining that the Executive is not working. While this view seems to abound, when analysed against performance of the Executive over 25 years it is an overly simplistic interpretation. 

It is clear that significant disagreement and periods of suspension feed into the narrative of failure, a more nuanced assessment needs to be made. It is important to note that the Executive has had different members and different parties serving over the period of its existence. The Executive has existed across different phases of devolution. Moreover, the main reason the Executive was established was to bring stability to a post-conflict society, embedding cooperation between historically opposed parties, and delivering key policy outcomes. While the Executive has been imperfect, it has worked sufficiently well to deliver those key objectives. 

One of the key strengths of the Executive has been its ability to institutionalise cooperation between unionists and nationalists, something that was previously unthinkable during ‘the troubles’. The Trimble/Mallon Executive (1999–2002), despite its fragility, represents an important starting point. This iteration of the Executive established the principle of power-sharing, while overseeing some key policy delivery, most notably in equality and policing. 

Given the rows that have beset politics in Northern Ireland the accomplishment of getting unanimous agreement to policing reform should not be underestimated. In 2001 the SDLP Agriculture Minister was able to get unanimous support for an all-island approach to combating animal disease, even leading Ian Paisley to conclude “our people are British; but our cows are Irish”. While it ultimately collapsed over issues such as IRA decommissioning, this period demonstrated that cross-community governance was possible.

A stronger case for effectiveness can be seen in the Paisley/McGuinness Executive (2007–2008), often referred to as the “Chuckle Brothers” period. This was a highly symbolic and practical success. The firebrand leader of the DUP and the former IRA commander worked together in a stable and cooperative manner, totally unthinkable just a few years before. During this period, the Executive completed a full term, something which may seem unremarkable, but unprecedented in politics here. This demonstrated if political will exists, the system can work.

Similarly, the Robinson/McGuinness Executive (2008–2015) provided one of the longest periods of uninterrupted devolved government. This era saw tangible policy achievements, such as economic initiatives to attract foreign investment, education reform and agreements on contentious issues like policing and justice powers being devolved. The Executive also handled the global financial crisis, showing resilience in difficult economic conditions. No doubt tension existed, especially over welfare reform and the Stormont House talks were needed, but this period proved the Executive can be stable if it has two leaders who respect each other, even if they do not agree.

The Foster years, however, were more turbulent, The Foster/ McGuinness/ O’Neill Executive led to dysfunction, scandal and collapse. However, while the RHI scandal and a row over Irish language funding brought the structures down, it could be argued that this was more due to political disagreement and leadership shortcomings rather than a failure of the system itself. 

Similarly, it could be argued that the chaotic handling of the COVID crisis by the restored Foster/O’Neill Executive was more to do with personality than policy. The animal disease crisis of the early 2000s, showed a major health emergency did not need to be an orange and green issue. 

More recently, the O’Neill/ Little-Pengelly Executive (2024–present) reflects the continued relevance and adaptability of the system. Despite prolonged deadlock over the Northern Ireland Protocol, the institutions were ultimately revived, suggesting that political parties still see value in power-sharing. The fact that parties return to the Executive after crises indicates that it remains the most viable model of governance in a society that is still divided.

However, the significant weaknesses of the Executive cannot be ignored. The most obvious issue is the repeated suspensions of the institutions, including from 2002–2007, 2017–2020, and 2022–2024. These long periods without devolved government highlight the system’s vulnerability to collapse. Critics rightly argue that stop/start Government leads to a weakening of public confidence and an inability to make real change and take big decisions that will bring long term change. 

Furthermore, the Executive has often been criticised for its lack of collective responsibility. Unlike traditional cabinets, ministers are largely autonomous and drawn from parties in opposition to each other, which can lead to policy incoherence and inefficiency. This was evident in disputes over budgetary issues during the Robinson/McGuinness era, when smaller parties had their departments financially hollowed out. Parties openly oppose decisions of Executive colleagues, as has recently happened in respect of Lough Neagh.

Additionally, the requirement for cross-community support can lead to political deadlock, particularly when parties use veto mechanisms such as the Petition of Concern. This has sometimes prevented progress on contentious social issues, suggesting that the system may prioritise stability over effective policy development.

Nevertheless, these weaknesses do not conclusively prove that the Executive has “simply not worked.” Rather, they illustrate that it is a deliberately complex system designed to manage division, not eliminate it. The aim of the peace process is ultimately to ensure an end to violence, in that regard the Executive has largely been successful. 

In conclusion, while the Northern Ireland Executive has undoubtedly faced serious challenges and periods of dysfunction, it would be misleading to claim that it has not worked. A more balanced assessment is that the Executive has worked unevenly but fundamentally effectively, particularly when judged against the deeply divided context in which it operates